Abstract. The rapid rise of federated enterprises entails a new way of trust management by the fact that the enterprise can account for partial trust of its affiliating organizations. On the other hand, password has historically been used as a main means for user authentication because of operational simplicity. We are thus motivated to explore the use of short password for user authentication and key exchange in the context of federated enterprises. Exploiting the special structure of a federated enterprise, our proposed new architecture comprises an external server (managed by each affiliating organization) and a central server (managed by the enterprise headquarter). We are concerned with the development of an efficient authentication and key exchange protocol using password, built over the new architecture. The architecture together with the protocol well addresses off-line dictionary attacks initiated at the server side, a problem rarely considered in prior effort.
Introduction
Driven by the promise of cost saving, expansion of market share and quality improvement of service provision through consolidation and cooperation, industry has seen a rapid rise of federated enterprises. Specifically, a federated enterprise consolidates under one corporate umbrella multiple divisions, branches and affiliations serving different aspects of business continuum and service coverage. For example, in the banking sector, a central bank has numerous branches distributed across a city, a region. Another example is in the healthcare area, where a federated hospital integrates many inside and outside units, e.g., clinical laboratories, departments, outpatient clinics, managed care organizations, pharmacies and so on. In such a federated enterprise, each affiliating organization has its own business interest, providing service to a distinct group of users.
Following traditional ways, each affiliating organization has to work independently on trust management, maintaining by itself account information of its users. However, this may not be optimal in practice. First, the affiliating organizations may lack sufficient expertise and funds for the secure maintenance of user account. This situation further deteriorates with the trend that organizations are becoming increasingly fond of outsourcing IT management to some specialized service providers. In such cases, system administrators may present themselves as a big threat to system security [7] . Second, from the users perspective, a user apparently prefers to assuming the higher credit of the entire enterprise rather than that of an individual affiliating organization. For these reasons, new paradigm of trust management that well takes advantage of the special structure of federated enterprises is of interest and urgency.
On the other hand, human memorable password has historically been used as a main means for user authentication, due to operational simplicity. In particular, no dedicated device is required for storing password, which is of particular importance as users are becoming increasingly roaming nowadays. We are thus interested in exploring the use of short password for user authentication and key exchange in the context of federated enterprises. Towards this, we are faced to first address the weaknesses inherent in password-enabled systems. Primarily, because of a limited dictionary space, password is susceptible to brute-force dictionary attacks, and more precisely off-line dictionary attacks 1 [15] . Specifically, in offline dictionary attacks, an attacker records the transcript of a successful login between a user and the server, and then enumerates every possible password and checks against the transcript, until eventually determine a correct password. Tremendous effort has been dedicated to resisting offline dictionary attacks in password-enabled protocols (e.g., [1, 4, 5, 17, 13, 6, 18, 8] ). An assumption common to these methods is that the server is completely reliable, so users share with the server clear passwords or some easily-derived values of passwords for subsequent user authentication. As such, while these protocols are sufficiently robust to off-line dictionary attacks by the outside attackers, they are not intended to defend against the server, e.g., in the event of penetration by outside attackers.
However, for the reasons discussed earlier (limited expertise and funds, outsourcing, etc.), threat posed by the server becomes clearer in the setting of federated enterprises. As a consequence, servers maintained by the affiliating organizations of an enterprise are no longer deemed fully trusted. Adapting password-enabled systems to federated enterprises has to additionally mitigate the concern of unreliable servers, apart from outside attackers. To that end, we propose a new architecture for user authentication and key exchange using password, geared to the needs of federated enterprises. In its simplest configuration, the architecture consists of an external server managed by each affiliating organization and a central server administrated by the enterprise; each server only keeps partial information on user passwords, such that no single server can recover the passwords by means of off-line dictionary attacks; user authentication is accomplished jointly by the two servers. Our attention is given to the development of an efficient authentication protocol for the new architecture, rather than solid formal provable security. The proposed architecture together with the protocol enjoys several attractive features.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related work. We then present our new architecture and discuss extension in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an efficient user authentication and key exchange protocol well attuned to the new architecture, and security of the protocol is examined. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Related Work
Resistance to off-line dictionary attacks has long been in the core of research on password-enable systems. It is a proven fact that public key techniques are absolutely necessary so as to resist off-line dictionary attacks, whereas the involvement of public key cryptosystems is not essential [13] . Accordingly, two separate lines of research have been seen in the literature: combined use of password and public key cryptosystem, and password only methods. In the former cases, asymmetry of capacity between the users and the server is considered, so that a user only uses a password while the server has a public/private key pair at its disposal. Examples of such public key-assisted password authentication include [11, 13, 6] . Not surprisingly, the use of public keys entails the deployment of PKI for certification, adding to the users the burden of checking key validity. To eliminate this drawback, password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols have been extensively explored (e.g., [1, 4, 5, 17, 18, 8] ). The PAKE protocols do not involve any public key cryptosystem.
What common to the above methods is the assumption that the server is totally trustful, so a user shares a password or some password-derivative value with the server. In other words, these methods are by no means resilient to the off-line dictionary attacks initiated by the server, e.g., in the event of break-ins by outside attackers. To address this problem, [10] first proposed the so-called password hardening technique by transforming a weak password into a strong one through several servers, thereby eliminating the single point of vulnerability. Afterwards, [14] improved this multi-server model. Further and more rigorous extension was due to [19] and [20] , where the former built a t-out-of-n threshold PAKE protocol and gave formal security proof under the Random Oracle Model [9] , and the latter presented another two provably secure threshold PAKE protocols under the standard model. A limitation of the protocols in [19] and [20] is their low efficiency, so they may not be practical to resourceconstrained users, e.g., mobile phones. Moreover, notice that in the above multi-server setting, password is still susceptible to a weaker form of a single point of vulnerability, in the sense that passwords are eventually reconstructed by a dealer at the time of user authentication.
By contrast, in our architecture no trust exists between the central server and the external server, thus the single point of vulnerability is completely eliminated. This however adds substantial challenges to the design of the underlying authentication protocol. Our basic architecture (one central server is involved) is similar to a recent novel two-server model in [3] , which was to overcome the deficiency of complex and computation extensive protocols in [19, 20] . Distinctions between our work and [3] include: (a) we achieve mutual (bilateral) authentication as well as key exchange, whereas [3] considered merely unilateral authentication of the user to the servers, and no key exchange; (b) we develop a different protocol for testing the equality of two numbers under our presumed adversary model. Without a similar explicitly specified adversary model, the protocol in [3] may cause trouble in case that one of the two servers deliberately disrupts the protocol, attempting to gain advantages over the other; (c) our architecture is tailored to federated enterprises, whereas the model in [3] was suggested for an organization outsoucing a part of its trust management to a security service provider; (d) we also suggest extending the basic architecture to an architecture including a group of central servers, solving the possible bottleneck caused by one single central server.
A New Authentication Architecture for Federated Enterprises
Our basic architecture is shown in Figure 1 : at the server side, an external server and a central server coexist; the external server is the actual one providing service to the users, thereby standing front-end; the central server is to assist the external server for user authentication, staying transparent to the users. A main objective of this architecture is to "harden" a user's short password into two long secrets and each is hosted by a server, so that neither of the servers can launch off-line dictionary attacks. As discussed earlier, a uniqueness of this architecture is represented by the fact that no trust exists between the two servers. This on the one hand totally eliminates the single point of vulnerability, on the other hand makes the design of the underlying password-enabled protocol particularly challenging. In particular, the two servers together validate user passwords, whereas no extra information should be leaked to each other to facilitate off-line dictionary attacks. Figure 2 shows the scenario when applying this basic structure to a federated enterprise: the headquarter of the enterprise manages the cen- tral server, and each affiliating organization operates an external server, providing service to a group of users of its own. This architecture offers several benefits:
1. First of all, of particular advantage is that neither the central server nor the external servers can compromise user passwords by means of off-line dictionary attacks. 2. Affiliating organizations are relieved from strict trust management to some extent, so they can dedicate their limited expertise and resources to enhancing service provision to the users. 3. Users are afforded to assume the higher credit of the enterprise, while engaging business with individual affiliating organizations. 4. The enterprise is provided a way to monitor the affiliating organizations, deterring them from cheating. 5. As the central sever is hidden from the public, the chance for it under attacks is substantially minimized, thereby increasing the overall security of the architecture.
Extension
In the basic architecture, a single central server is to collaborate with numerous external servers in a federated enterprise. It is thus possible that the central server becomes a system bottleneck. To mitigate this concern, we suggest extending to include several central servers as a group as shown in Figure 3 . The group of central servers work under a t-out- Fig. 3 . Extended architecture including a group of central servers of-n threshold secret sharing scheme (e.g., [21] ), so that each holds a share of the secret that would be otherwise kept by a single central server (n is the total number of the central servers). When an external server requests for user authentication, one of the servers volunteers to manage the reconstruction of the secret among the group. This voluntary central server is the only one interacting with the requesting external server, thus the external server feels nothing different as with a single central server. This extension not only solves the potential bottleneck problem, but also addresses the issue of failures or break downs of a single central server.
An Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol Using Password
In this section, we shall detail the authentication and key exchange protocol using password, which is geared to the setting of federated enterprises. The protocol is built over the basic architecture in Figure 1 . Extension to the extended architecture in Figure 3 is also discussed. A central building block of our protocol is a sub-protocol for testing the equality of two numbers. For ease of reference, we start with listing the notations that are used in the sequel.
p, q two large primes such that p = 2q + 1. g a generator of a subgroup of Z * p of order q. π a user's password. h(.) a cryptographic hash function modelled as the random oracle [9] . U , ES, CS identity of a user, the external sever and the central server, respectively. EX (.)/DX (.) encryption and decryption functions (of a semantic secure public key cryptosystem) by entity X's public key and private key, respectively. 
The setting
Three types of entities are involved in our system, i.e., the users, the external servers and the central server. For the purpose of authentication, each user U has a short password π, and π is transformed into two long secrets, each of which is held by the external server ES that U belongs to and the central server CS, respectively. CS stays transparent to the public, and ES acts as the relaying party between U and CS. In such a scenario, it is reasonable to assume authentic communications between ES and CS. Definitely, this assumption can be readily accomplished by the two parties sharing a secret, which is used to key a MAC. Considering the close tie between the two parties, it is also convenient for them to periodically (e.g., once a week) update this secret, e.g., the headquarter (CS) sends a new secret to the affiliating organization (ES) by normal mail weekly. CS has an authentic key pair that corresponds to a semantically secure public key cryptosystem, with the encryption function (resp. decryption function) E CS (.) (resp. D CS (.)). As discussed earlier, in a federated enterprise, CS clearly assumes more trust than ES because of sufficient expertise, funds, and the fact that CS is not directly exposed to the public. Considering such asymmetry in terms of trust upon CS and ES, adversary model in our protocol is that CS is semi-honest and ES is malicious, with respect to their desire for off-line dictionary attacks, and they do not collude. More specifically, CS is honest-but-curious [12] , i.e., it follows the protocol, with the exception that it may try to derive extra information by analyzing the protocol transcript; on the contrary, ES may act arbitrarily for uncovering user passwords.
High level description
Central to our protocol is to fight against off-line dictionary attacks by the servers (Note that outside attackers are clearly no more powerful than the external server in this regard). The intuition behind our authentication and key exchange protocol is as follows: in a out-of-band registration phase, the user U "hardens" his password π into two random long secrets s and π + s, and registers them to the external server ES and the central server CS, respectively, where s is a random number. In authentication phase, U picks another long random number r and sends r and π + r to the two servers, respectively. Upon receiving the messages, ES computes a = r − s, and CS computes b = (π + r) − (π + s) = r − s. Afterwards, the two servers engage into an interactive protocol to test a ? = b. Note that a = b holds if and only if the user U knows π. Upon the servers validating the user, ES and U negotiate a common session key for subsequent data exchanges. Clearly, from s and r (resp. π + s and π + r), ES (resp. CS) is unable to gain anything useful on π. It is thus of crucial importance to ensure the protocol for testing a ? = b could not facilitate the servers for off-line dictionary attacks. In what follows, we first propose a protocol allowing two parties to test a ? = b, which will be invoked by our final authentication and key exchange protocol that follows. A variant is that A sends G a = g a mod p to B and B sends G b = g b mod p to A, where p and g are defined as in Table 1 ; each party then checks G a ? = G b . Both methods however cannot avert off-line dictionary attacks by the two parties. Take the first example and A for instance, A chooses a random number r and computes a = r − s for himself, and simply sends r to B. B will return h(r − s − π) to A. It is easy to see that A can enumerate every possible password until find π , such that h(a − π ) = h(r − s − π). In the same way, the attack applies to the variant example, although in normal cases, it is hard to get a (resp. b) given G a (resp. G b ) according to discrete logarithm problem. These examples convey to some extent the subtleties in designing such a protocol in our case of withstanding off-line dictionary attacks.
Let QR p denote the group of quadratic residues modulo p, and a hash function be defined as h : {0, 1} |p| → QR p , where p, q, h(.) are public parameters and as defined in Table 1 . Our proposed protocol for testing a ? = b works as outlined in Figure 4 (all arithmetic operations are calculated modulo p). Security analysis In line with the adversary model defined in our final protocol, we assume A a malicious adversary while B an honest-butcurious adversary. In addition, for the moment, we assume A does not replay messages, and the communication between A and B is authentic. These assumptions will be clear when we come to our final protocol.
We start by by claiming that upon completion of the protocol, either Our next claim is that if A aborts the protocol before completion, he is unable to gain more advantages over B. To see this, the only place A is likely to abort is after receiving y B from B. But as we have discussed, y B does not leak anything on b. Our claim thus holds. We stress that as an honest-but-curious adversary, B is not interested in deviating from the protocol, e.g., deliberately aborting the protocol or sending ⊥ in the case of w A = w B . In this sense, our protocol achieves "fairness".
Authentication and key exchange using password
We now present an efficient authentication and key exchange protocol using password, built over the basic architecture in Figure 1 . The earlier protocol for testing a ? = b is invoked in this protocol as a building block, where ES plays the role of A and CS takes the role of B. In the sequel, we occasionally omit "modulo p" in stating arithmetic operations in case that this can be easily seen from the context. System parameters are defined as follows: p and q are as defined in Table 1 , and QR p is the group of quadratic residues modulo p. A cryptographic hash function H(.) (e.g., SHA1) is employed. Moreover, g is picked from QR p as g ∈ R QR p \ {1}. Clearly, g is of order of q. H(.), p, q and g are public parameters.
To enrol as a legitimate user in a service, it is natural that at the beginning, a user must authenticate to the service provider and in turn establish a password with the organization for subsequent service access. In our case, U needs to register to not only the actual service provider ES but also the enterprise CS that ES is affiliated to.
Registration Suppose U has already successfully authenticated to ES, e.g., by showing his identity card, U picks his password π and selects a random number s ∈ R QR p . U then registers in a secure way s and π + s mod p to ES and CS, respectively. For purely simplicity reasons, we assume (π + s mod p)∈ QR p 2 . As a result, ES stores the account information (U , s) to its secret database, and CS stores (U , π + s mod p) to its secret database. Someone may wonder how U registers π + s to CS, as CS is supposed hidden from the public. This is in fact not a problem in practice: U can contact CS by normal mail, etc. Indeed, imagine that a user enrols in a branching bank, it is not strange at all that the user still needs to submit a secret to a higher authority of the bank so as to activate his account.
Upon completion of the registration, U can request service from ES, by exploiting the protocol in Figure 5 for authentication and establishment of a common session key.
The protocol Let us follow the protocol (in Figure 5 ) step by step. To initiate the protocol, U picks x as x ∈ R Z q and computes e x = g x mod p, which will be used for (Diffie-Hellman) key exchange. U also selects r as r ∈ R Z q , and encrypts e x , π + r mod p and T using CS's authentic public key as e 0 = E CS (e x , π + r, T ), where T is the current timestamp. U then sends in M 1 the message of (U, e x , r, e 0 , T ) to ES. Upon receipt of the message, ES first checks whether T is within a pre-defined time window: If a = b, CS rejects and ES in turn replies reject to U . Otherwise, CS chooses z ∈ R Z q and computes e z = g z mod p, which is in turn used to "encrypt" π + s as e 2 = (e x ) z (π + s) mod p. CS then sends in M 4 the message of (e x , e z , e 2 ) to ES. Upon receiving the message, ES checks whether e x = e x (e x is being kept alive in the buffer) to ensure that e x received in M 1 has not been replaced by outside attackers. Interestingly, here e x and e x are serving an extra purpose of "freshness nonces". If e x = e x , ES notifies CS and sends reject to U . Otherwise, ES picks y ∈ R Z q and computes e y = g y mod p. e y is then used to "encrypt" s as e 1 
ES).
Security analysis Our architecture is different from either the standard client-server model (e.g., [8, 13] ) or the multiple-server model (e.g., [19, 20] ), so solid formal provable security may be quite involved. We thus give an informal security analysis for the moment. The primary goal of this protocol is to resist off-line dictionary attacks by the two servers, where ES is a malicious adversary and CS is an honest-but-curious adversary under the adversary model that represents different levels of trust upon ES and CS. It is easy to see that outside attackers are no more powerful than ES in terms of the capability to uncover U 's password. Admittedly, outside attackers can act as man-in-the-middle between U and ES, resulting in a legitimate user being deemed illegitimate by the servers. Discussion of such attacks is beyond the scope of this work as they are not relevant to the attacks for deriving password.
Resistance to CS:
In the protocol, what relevant to CS for off-line dictionary attacks is (π + r mod p, π + s mod p), as well as the interactive protocol for testing a ? = b. Clearly, from π + r mod p and π + s mod p, CS is unable to learn anything on π; as discussed earlier, the protocol for testing a ? = b leaks nothing more on π. Consequently, as a passive semi-trusted adversary, CS cannot launch effective off-line dictionary attacks.
Resistance to ES:
Intuitively, if following the protocol, of help to ES regarding off-line dictionary attacks are (r, e 0 ) and (s, e 2 ). However, E CS (.) is a semantic secure encryption, so the first pair does not help in dictionary attacks; notice then that (e z , e 2 ) is a standard ElGamal encryption. As widely known, it is also semantic secure when g ∈ QR p and (π + s mod p)∈ QR p as in our case. Therefore, off-line dictionary attacks by ES are not effective if he follows the protocol (behaving as a passive adversary).
As an active adversary, ES can modify or forge protocol transcript. To see this, ES may pick x of its choice and computes e x , and in turn makes a dubious e 0 , in an attempt to deceive CS into replying with e 2 under his e x . This cheating however cannot succeed, due to that without knowing π, ES is not able to convince CS of a = b. We do notice that in such a way, ES can launch on-line dictionary attacks by repeatedly guessing passwords, and engaging in the protocol for testing a ? = b: each time CS returns ⊥ (reject), ES is assured to exclude a password. However, it is clear that such attacks are unavoidable in any password-enabled system, but readily thwarted by limiting the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts (regarding a same user) made by ES.
Security to outside adversaries:
While no more effective than ES in terms of dictionary attacks, an outside adversary could attempt to acquire the common session key established between U and ES. This is another common attack to authentication and key exchange protocols. In our protocol, as the adversary does not know π, he has no way to negotiate a dubious common session key with ES in the name of U . What remains to consider is the scenario that the adversary derives the session key K by watching the protocol transcript between U and ES. This, in our case, is clearly equivalent to breaking the Diffie-Hellman problem: given g x mod p and g y mod p without knowing x and y, to compute g xy mod p.
Extension We introduce briefly how to adapt the protocol to the extended architecture in Figure 3 that includes a group of central servers. The extension turns out to be straightforward. The central servers work under a t-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme [21] , each keeping a share of π +s that would be otherwise preserved by a single central server. At the time an external server requests for user authentication, one of the servers volunteers to be the dealer, managing the reconstruction of π + s. The voluntary dealer is the only one interacting with the requesting external server. While the dealer could become a single point of vulnerability, compromise of it actually affects solely those π + s that had ever been reconstructed on it. Furthermore, as already discussed, the chance of compromising a central server is practically minor. After all, this extension at the central server side is actually aimed at solving possible bottleneck problems and break-downs due to a single central server.
Discussions
The proposed protocol enjoys several advantages. Among others, first, the protocol is particularly efficient to the users in terms of both communication and computation. As to computation, a user only needs to compute 2 one-line exponentiations, and 1 off-line exponentiation and 1 off-line public key encryption. This is important when considering to support resource-constrained users, e.g., mobile phones. The communication to the users is optimal, only one round of interaction is involved. Second, a user can use the same password to register to different enterprises or to different affiliating organizations in a same enterprise (by varying s). This avoids a big inconvenience in traditional password-enabled systems (e.g., those reviewed in Section 2), where a user has to memorize different passwords for different applications.
Finally, we clarify a possible argument why we do not simply rely on the central server(s) for full trust management of the affiliating organizations, a paradigm similar to Kerberos [16] . The reasons are as follows: first, each affiliating organization has its own business interest, so it has a stake to involve into the trust management of its own; second and more important, a main objective of our architecture is to avoid the single point of vulnerability.
Conclusions
We explored applying authentication and key exchange using password to federated enterprises. Taking advantage of the special structure of a federated enterprise, a new architecture comprising an external server and a central server was proposed. A user authentication and key exchange protocol using password that is geared to the architecture was presented. Attention was focused on resisting off-line dictionary attacks by the servers, a topic rarely considered in previous effort. Our proposed architecture and protocol enjoyed several attractive features.
